For at least half a century, Western intellectuals have explicitly espoused various “third ways” in politics, economics, and religion. Such doctrines attempt to synthesize elements of what are understood to be divergent accounts of phenomena, and in so doing, purport to capture reality more accurately than either account on their own. What’s more, these third-way doctrines tend to style themselves as a more sophisticated alternative to brute ideology: they are above the fray, neutral, nuanced.

My own view is that third-way doctrines are none of these, and to the contrary, benefit solely from the politesse that is the sidestepping of contentious issues. If you stake no position on that which is contentious, your doctrine appears stronger insofar as it elicits less criticism. But this supposed strength comes at the expense of saying anything at all.

As a matter of discerning truth, as opposed to concerning oneself with “optics”, there’s no particular reason to believe that a synthesis of two contrary positions should yield a position more accurate than either. If a color-blind person perceives a green object as red, and another perceives it as green, we do not thereby conclude the object is really brown. If we were to do so, we would eliminate precisely the relevant difference between the persons, i.e., colorblindness.

For substantive doctrines, the situation is more dire in that each consists of mutually interdependent truth claims. Weakening one means that coherency of the whole is compromised. The mechanics of walking and driving are distinct, and averaging them does not produce jogging.

However, there is also a more basic objection that is available to opponents of thirdwayism, and that involves its own consistency. Does the third-way approach even survive itself?

Suppose we have two positions:

1. Thirdwayism: In combining some elements of doctrine A with some other elements of doctrine B, one forms a superior doctrine.
2. Anti-thirdwayism: In combining some elements of doctrine A with some other elements of doctrine B, one may or may not form a superior doctrine.

Now, if these are understood to be doctrines themselves, then we might propose as an instance of thirdwayism that:

• In combining some elements of thirdwayism with some other elements of anti-thirdwayism, one forms a doctrine that is superior to both.

How unusual it would be if that very practice being promoted demands its own immediate refinement. Are we making claims about truth and reality, or just saddling other people with our homework assignments?

A thirdwayist might object that these are over-simplified stances, and that the third-way isn’t merely a mechanical procedure. It may be said the third-way involves carefully choosing the best in opposing doctrines to produce a superior third. That is:

• In combining the best elements of thirdwayism with the best elements of anti-thirdwayism, one forms a doctrine that is superior to both.

Contrary to supporting thirdwayism, this only strengthens the position of the anti-thirdwayist. It is a confession that thirdwayism doesn’t somehow produce a superior doctrine from doctrines A and B on its own, but that some specific standard is needed to pick the “best elements” from A and B.

This standard is really just unstated doctrine, or a set of unstated truth claims. But articulating where our doctrines are strong and weak, and where alternative views may improve or diminish these, is substantially what we’re all doing when we argue in the first place.

We are thus left with two groups in actuality: Those who are transparently in some contention, and those who conceal their prior ideological commitments to produce the appearance of equanimity.